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1. Introduction
This is a critical moment in our cultural life. The ownership and control 
of information resources is one of the most important forms of power in 
contemporary society.1 Digital technologies therefore have the potential 
to alter and subvert power structures by changing the ways in which we 
access, engage with, and participate in the creation of these resources. 
By the same token, intellectual property laws have the capacity to shore 
up existing power structures and limit creative practices by enforcing 
and expanding traditional proprietary norms in the digital environment. 
Networked technologies present unprecedented opportunities for creative 
expression and participation in public discourse; but these technologies, 
and the activities they facilitate, are subject to legal regimes that allocate 
exclusive rights over information resources, restricting their creation, 
 dissemination and development.
 Copyright law, which creates exclusive rights over intellectual expres-
sion, is one such regime. Copyright attaches to original literary, dramatic, 
musical and artistic expression, granting authors and subsequent owners 
the power to control the production, reproduction, publication and per-
formance of their works. Fundamentally, copyright is no more than ‘the 
right to multiply copies of a published work, or the right to make the work 
public and still retain the bene! cial interest therein.’2 But through the 
powers of control that it grants to authors and subsequent owners, copy-
right regulates the production and exchange of meaning and information, 
and shapes social relations of communication. Writers, artists, musicians, 
performers, software programmers, publishers, students, researchers, 
librarians, teachers, readers, movie-goers, music fans – and so, one might 
say, all of us – exist in a web of cultural relations subject to the law of 
copyright.
 The emergence of the digital world has rapidly generated a new public 
idea of communication, discourse, participation and production – one 
that values networking over singularity, and relationships over individua-
tion. Most importantly, however, this new public idea favours a collabora-
tive model of shared and cumulative cultural dialogue over a proprietary 
model of cultural production. Within this model, epitomised by social 
media, fan sites, digital sampling and ! le sharing, conventional ideas of 
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individual ownership are swept aside. This explains why the recent focus 
of intellectual property policy-makers around the globe has been pre-
dominantly on the threats rather than the promises of digital technology. 
Copyright appears to have arrived at a crossroads: it increasingly seems 
that a choice is being made between maximising the potential of the digital 
revolution and reinforcing the traditional norms of the analog world. 
Thankfully, this is a false dilemma: as I will argue, copyright contains 
within it the norms and aspirations that not only permit but necessitate the 
development of a robust cultural landscape3 in which citizens freely par-
ticipate – a social space made more open, accessible, democratic and vital 
by the advances of network technologies.
 From a utilitarian or instrumental perspective, the exclusive rights that 
copyright grants are justi! ed as a means by which to maximise cultural 
production and exchange by encouraging the production of intellectual 
works. The underlying rationale is that such works will be under-produced 
unless authors are given su"  cient opportunity to exploit them for ! nan-
cial return.4 Rationalised in these terms, the exclusive rights of authors 
might be said to ‘encourage learning’5 and to ‘promote the progress of the 
useful arts’.6 From this it should follow that the rights granted to authors 
under the copyright system a"  rm the value that we as a society place in 
the cultural exchange and interaction represented by the production and 
dissemination of intellectual works.
 Many utilitarian versions of copyright theory presuppose but fail to 
explain this initial premise. A pure economic theory can justify copyright 
in terms of the economic incentive it o# ers for authors qua rational eco-
nomic actors, but economics alone cannot explain the nature of the soci-
etal bene! ts that $ ow from this incentive. This requires us to understand 
the public interest that resides in the creation and exchange of intellectual 
expression. From a public interest perspective, the encouragement of cul-
tural production should be understood as the creation of opportunities 
for improved communication between members of society. The copyright 
system should be regarded as one element of a larger cultural and social 
policy aimed at encouraging the process of cultural exchange that new 
technologies facilitate. The economic and other incentives that copyright 
o# ers to creators of original expression are meant to encourage a partici-
patory and interactive society, and to further the social goods that $ ow 
through public dialogue. Copyright’s purpose is to create opportunities 
for people to speak, to develop relationships of communication between 
author and audience, and to fashion conditions that might cultivate a 
higher quality of expression.
 However, the role that copyright plays as a cultural and social policy 
tool is rarely appreciated. Rather, copyright is widely regarded as a 
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system whose purpose is the protection of private, proprietary rights. 
Notwithstanding the intangible and communicative nature of intellec-
tual expression, its categorisation as a species of so-called ‘intellectual 
property’, compounded by a particular understanding of the nature of 
authorship, causes copyright to be commonly conceptualised as just 
another form of private property. Viewed through the proprietary lens, 
the intellectual expression of the author is an object that is owned like 
any other. In the context of a market economy, it is simply a commod-
ity to be freely transferred and exploited in the marketplace. However, 
the language of ‘ownership’, ‘property’ and ‘commodity’ obfuscates the 
nature of copyright’s subject matter, and cloaks the social and cultural 
implications of copyright protection. As history reveals, it also appears to 
result in the continuous strengthening and expansion of the private rights 
that copyright a# ords. As such, the way that we traditionally think about 
copyright – particularly in the modern digital age where works are created, 
shared, accessed and transformed more easily and e"  ciently than ever 
before – is inapposite to the task that we expect it to perform. Copyright is 
in  desperate need of re-imagination.
 My aim, in this book, is to provide a route towards the re-imagination 
of copyright law. This process of re-imagining copyright is not cast as a 
radical or revolutionary one: rather, it works from within the copyright 
system, using the concepts and components that constitute the current 
system, only reconceptualising them within a revised theoretical frame-
work. Through this process, we are challenged to discard the loaded con-
ception of the author as a bearer of rights and an owner of property, and 
to adopt in its place a vision of the relational author as a participant in a 
process of cultural dialogue and exchange. This, in turn, requires that we 
resist the notion of original expression as a stable, objecti! able thing, and 
instead embrace the idea of the work as a text, utterance or communica-
tive act. Finally, this demands that we reject the characterisation of users 
of copyrighted works as actual or potential trespassers or pirates, and 
recognise them instead as active and equal participants in the very process 
of meaning-making and exchange that underpins copyright norms.
 Ultimately, this route should lead us to an understanding of copyright 
as a system designed to further the public good by encouraging improved 
relations of communication between members of society, and maximis-
ing discursive engagement in a collective conversation. Viewed through 
this lens, author and text are no longer individualised and isolated from 
their social situation: it becomes possible for the contours of copyright 
protection to re$ ect the dialogic and inherently social nature of cultural 
expression.
 As this suggests, the central concern of this book is the underlying 
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philosophy or theory of copyright law. I argue that our current copyright 
model is premised upon the political and ontological assumptions of 
traditional legal liberalism, and the normative assumptions of possessive 
individualism. These political underpinnings guide courts’ interpretation 
and application of copyright doctrine with the result that copyright law 
fails to adequately re$ ect the realities of cultural creativity, and frequently 
restricts the very communicative or expressive activities that it is meant to 
encourage. If copyright is to be a justi! able limitation upon the expres-
sive activities of the public, it must increase opportunities for qualitative 
cultural production and exchange, ultimately furthering our communica-
tion ideals. The appropriate limits of copyright’s protective sphere will 
become clear when we acknowledge that the copyright owner’s rights 
exist only through this public interest and not in spite of it. Where copy-
right obstructs rather than facilitates relations of communication, it goes 
beyond the bounds of its justi! cation.
 The crux of this re-imagined theoretical framework for copyright is 
developed in Part%I of the book, which challenges the liberal and neo-lib-
eral theorising implicit in modern copyright discourse. This lays the foun-
dation for the critique that builds throughout the book: namely, that the 
existing theoretical framework for copyright is responsible for the (mis)
construction of its core concepts. The concepts of authorship, originality 
and ownership are de! ned and shaped by the philosophical assumptions 
that we bring to bear on the processes of cultural creativity and the legal 
system that we have built in its name. These concepts, in turn, a# ect the 
operation of copyright law and the extent to which it achieves its policy 
goals. The current copyright model, constructed as it is around the tran-
scendent, rights-bearing author-self, is ill suited to the task of encouraging 
and maximising cultural creativity and the production and dissemination 
of new intellectual works.
 I propose a relational model as a more appropriate framework within 
which to understand the processes of authorship, its signi! cance for the 
author and the public, and consequently, the role and purpose of the 
copyright system. Chapter 2 critically examines the romantic conception 
of authorship that pervades copyright doctrine, and the power of this con-
ception to obscure the connection between origination and imitation while 
individualising the author and commodifying his work. Chapter 3 suggests 
an alternative version of copyright’s author-! gure, drawing upon feminist 
theory to develop a notion of the author as a situated, relational self, and 
authorship as a dialogic and formative process.
 I proceed in the following chapters to push towards copyright’s re-imag-
ination in these terms. I explore some of the principal concepts and con-
victions that have caused traditional copyright theory to misrecognise the 
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nature of the author, the public and the copyright system, and show how a 
shift in thinking may alter the shape of copyright. Part II of this book chal-
lenges the pervasive view that the origin of the copyright interest (in both 
the moral and legal sense) can be found in the industry or labour of the 
author. My overarching proposition is that it is a mistake to look solely 
to the relation between the author and her work as the basis on which to 
justify the copyright system or to de! ne the scope of the copyright inter-
est. In so doing, we necessarily neglect the social and cultural goals of 
copyright, and so wrongly augment the scope of the rights conferred under 
copyright while failing to identify and draw the appropriate limits thereto.
 Chapter 4 focuses primarily on the role of labour in de! ning the moral 
relation between the author and work by means of which the copyright 
interest is justi! ed. In particular, it tackles the common conviction, 
grounded in Lockean theory, that the author as intellectual labourer has a 
natural right to own the fruits of his labour. Chapter 5 focuses on the role 
of labour and other elements of authorship in de! ning the legal relation 
between author and work – what the author must do to establish a legal 
right over her work.7 I examine the doctrine of originality, which provides 
the de! ning characteristic of copyrightable expression, and therefore 
encapsulates many of the dominant misconceptions of modern copyright 
theory. I suggest that, by re-evaluating the originality threshold and its 
role in copyright disputes in light of a relational theory of authorship, the 
central doctrine of copyright law could be realigned with the public policy 
purposes of the copyright system.
 The dialogic theory of authorship advanced in this book emphasises the 
cumulative nature of cultural creativity. This reveals the $ aw inherent in 
the individualised account of original expression, but it also underscores 
the importance of downstream, meaning-generating uses of protected 
materials. To this end, it is essential that copyright leave space for the 
interactive, dialogic processes of cultural creativity if it is to enhance 
rather than obstruct relations of communication. As such, Part III focuses 
on the limits of the protection a# orded to copyright owners to allow for 
the use, transformation and ‘appropriation’ of protected works as de! ned 
by user exceptions, defences and rights.
 Chapter 6 takes critical aim at the restrictive fair dealing defence and 
other exceptions available to users, calling for a large and $ exible defence 
to copyright infringement (even in the face of technical controls) that 
adequately re$ ects the dialogic nature of creative processes and the criti-
cal role of users in the copyright system. Chapter 7 explores the relation-
ship between copyright protection and freedom of expression, employing 
relational theory to argue that both copyright and freedom of expression 
embody the values that we as a society attach to communication and 
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 discursive interaction between the members of our community: copy-
right’s legitimacy therefore depends upon its capacity to accommodate 
and enhance the principles of free expression.
 Much of the doctrinal analysis contained in these chapters is con-
ducted in the context of Canadian jurisprudence. Recent developments 
in Canada, and in particular the Canadian copyright narrative that has 
emerged from the Supreme Court of Canada over the past decade,8 make 
the Canadian context a fertile one in which to develop a far-reaching 
theory of copyright. Moreover, Canada occupies a unique position in 
the common law copyright world: it inherited its copyright system from 
the United Kingdom; it developed its copyright doctrine in the context 
of a ‘mixed’ common and civil law system, drawing in part on con-
tinental in$ uences; and, with the United States as its only neighbour and 
largest trading partner, it is consistently reactive to US developments and 
 political pressures.
 In the United States, the analysis of copyright theory often starts and 
ends with the US Constitution and the power of congress under Article 
1 to ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.’9 In the US Supreme Court deci-
sion of Eldred v. Ashcroft,10 however, the practical force of this clause 
proved to be far less than many had hoped. Indeed, the US copyright 
narrative has largely fragmented over recent years into property-based 
discourse and anti-instrumentalist agendas, as evidenced by the enactment 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998.11 Meanwhile, in Britain, 
the copyright narrative has been disrupted, and policy-making largely 
dominated, by developments at the European Union level. Principled 
theorising proves di"  cult in a context where copyright laws are shaped by 
international obligations that derive from principles foreign to the juris-
diction.12 Because Canada has lacked a concrete statement of copyright’s 
purpose, and because it is (at least o"  cially) free to shape its copyright law 
according to its own prerogatives (within the con! nes of its obligations 
as a member of the World Trade Organization13), the Canadian context 
o# ers greater space within which to contemplate the purposes, principles 
and potential of copyright law in the digital age. For these reasons, the 
Canadian legal experience a# ords an interesting and illustrative example 
from which larger general – indeed universal – lessons can be learned.
 The overarching theme of this book is the need to discard notions of 
natural right, individual entitlement and private property in copyright 
theory, and to re-imagine copyright in relational terms of communica-
tion, community and cultural policy. Throughout the arguments that I 
have sketched in this introduction lies the unifying proposition: only by 
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regarding copyright from a public interest perspective and recognising 
the social value of discursive engagement can we appreciate the system’s 
incentivisation of cultural production as a means by which to enhance 
relations of communication. Furthermore, it is only by understanding the 
nature of the author-self as socially situated and intrinsically relational 
that we can appreciate the importance of communication and dialogue in 
the  formation of human identity and community.
 Individualising authorship and propertising intellectual expression 
causes us to miss what it is that matters about cultural creativity; and so it 
guarantees that we fail to recognise the real rationale behind the copyright 
system. The re-imagination of copyright is therefore essential if we are to 
fully comprehend the social goals that justify its existence – and if we are 
to have any hope of achieving them.
NOTES
 1. James Boyle, ‘A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?’ 
(1997) 47 Duke L.J. 87 at 87: ‘Everyone says that we are moving to an information age. 
Everyone says that the ownership and control of information is one of the most impor-
tant forms of power in contemporary society. These ideas are so well-accepted, such 
clichés, that I can get away with saying them in a law review article without footnote 
support.’ The irony of this footnote is not lost on me.
 2. Underwriters’ Survey Bureau Ltd v. Massie & Renwick Ltd (1936) [1937] Ex. C.R. 15 
at 20 (Maclean J.), varied [1937] S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.). Cited in John S. McKeown, Fox 
Canadian Law of Copyright and Industrial Designs, 3rd edn (Scarborough, Ontario: 
Thomson Canada Ltd, 2000) at 1.
 3. Cf. Julie E. Cohen, ‘Copyright, Commodi! cation, and Culture: Locating the Public 
Domain’ in L. Guibault and P.B. Hugenholtz (eds), The Future of the Public Domain 
(Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006) at 121–66.
 4. See e.g. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2003).
 5. The ! rst modern copyright statute, the Statute of Anne 1709, pronounced its purpose 
to be ‘the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the 
Authors or Purchasers if such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned.’ For inter-
esting discussion regarding the historical beginnings of copyright regulation see: L. Ray 
Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 
1968); Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1993).
 6. Art. 1 §8, cl. 8 of the U.S. Constitution. This empowerment clause explicitly enshrines 
into the Constitution an instrumentalist account of copyright law.
 7. The distinction between the legal and moral relation between author and work is 
explained by Christian G. Stallberg, ‘Towards a New Paradigm in Justifying Copyright: 
A Universalistic-Transcendental Approach’ (2008) 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & 
Ent. L.J. 333 at 343–4.
 8. See Daniel Gervais, ‘A Canadian Copyright Narrative’ (2008) 21 Intellectual Property 
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 9. US Const., note 6 above.
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11. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). See Gervais, note 8 above at 293–4.
12. A pertinent example is Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases [1996] O.J. L77/20,
art 3.1 (‘[D]atabases which, by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents,
constitute the author’s own intellectual creation shall be protected as such by copy-
right’). Cf. Sections 3 and 3A of the British Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as
amended by the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 SI 1997/3032).
This replaced the traditional ‘labour and skill’ threshold with an ‘intellectual creation’
threshold for copyright in data compilations.
13. Canada is therefore bound by the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April
1994, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
CRAIG PRINT.indd 8   29/06/2011 10:01   
